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EXCERPTS 
 
North Korea’s plea for humanitarian assistance, which first came in 1995, 
provided an opening for South Korean NGOs to become directly involved in South-North 
relations. Between 1995 and 1998, progressive NGOs and religious groups took the lead 
in pressing for emergency aid to the North at a time when the South Korean government 
was taking a more cautious and measured approach. With the launching of the Sunshine 
policy by President Kim Dae Jung (1998-2003), followed by the Peace and Prosperity 
Policy of President Roh Moo Hyun (2003-2008), the role of civil society in South-North 
relations was recognized and actively promoted by the government.  
 
Over the past decade, South Korean civil society and humanitarian NGOs in 
particular, have constituted an important aspect of the South’s overall engagement 
initiative toward North Korea.The NGOs have aspired to reduce human suffering in the 
North, demonstrate the goodwill of the South Korean people, reduce hostility and build 
trust, and help create the basis for reconciliation between people in the North and South. 
Allowing for differences among the organizations and the need for following a learning 
curve, the South Korean NGOs, to a large extent, have achieved these goals. However, if 
the South Korean government continues to expand direct aid and economic cooperation 
with the North, the NGOs will face a new environment with problems of financial 
stability, project sustainability, absence of North Korean non-governmental counterparts, 
and the need to define a distinctive role. If they successfully meet these challenges, the 
humanitarian NGOs will play a critical role in laying the basis for eventual reconciliation 
between the peoples of the North and South. 
 
… 
 
The Korean Sharing Movement (KSM) is perhaps the most influential and 
broadly based NGO aiding North Korea. The KSM was formed in 1997 by prominent 
religious and secular groups and individuals, many of whom had been active in the 
democratization movement, to mobilize the public to send food aid to the North. Other 
organizations directly affiliated with Protestant, Catholic and Buddhist religious groups 
also responded early in the crisis. They draw their support directly from their religious 
institutions and supporters. The third category includes large welfare-oriented NGOs that 
had been well established before the North Korean crisis emerged and developed special 
programs addressing the needs of vulnerable groups in the North, especially children. 
Professional associations, primarily of medical doctors, became involved after the 2000 
summit to provide direct service and technical assistance. The final category is composed 
of several organizations initiated with the support of the Korean government to 
implement particular projects that the government placed high priority on. These include 
large-scale rice cultivation, sericulture and reforestation projects implemented primarily 
in the Mt. Kumgang resort and areas bordering the Kaesong Industrial Complex. 
 
… 
 
It seems clear that South Koreans, after more than a decade of engagement with 
an increasing level of civilian participation, have developed a more nuanced and realistic 
view of the North. One indication of this is a trend that seems to be emerging in the 
thinking of two non-governmental sectors, the humanitarian NGOs and the human rights 
advocacy groups. Until recently, these were two camps which had very different 
priorities and followed different strategies. The NGOs aimed to reduce suffering in the 
North through humanitarian engagement, which meant that all open criticism of the 
North Korean regime and system should be muted. The human rights organizations 
claimed that the North should be “blamed and shamed” in order to end the most abusive 
rights violations as quickly as possible. The experience of the past decade and the much 
greater information base on the North now available seem to have convinced some key 
elements in both camps that coordinating their efforts may be the best engagement 
strategy. A tentative dialogue has begun between representatives of the humanitarian and 
human rights groups in South Korea to share information about conditions in the North 
and develop joint analyses on which to base programming. 
  
The decade-long humanitarian project of South Korean NGOs has probably had 
greater impact on the thinking about reconciliation and unification in the South than in 
the North. If NGO engagement continues to influence South Koreans toward a 
consensual view about how to relate with the North, and toward support for pragmatic 
approaches that go beyond charity to encourage change, then the NGOs will certainly 
have made a major contribution toward peaceful resolution of the South-North division. 
 
… 
 
Assessment and Challenges  
 
The evidence indicates that South Korean humanitarian NGOs have, to a large extent, 
realized their goals of delivering humanitarian aid directly to the people of North Korea. 
They have created and expanded channels for direct contact between people in the South 
and North. They have generated flows of information that have had a real, though 
asymmetrical, impact on how North and South Koreans understand each other. The 
NGOs have added a dimension to the South’s engagement policy toward the North that 
would have been absent if interaction was solely on a government-to-government basis. 
They have enabled contact between the South and North to be maintained at some 
minimum level even as the official relationship has fluctuated. This success has been 
achieved in spite of suspicion and resistance on the part of the North and a lack of 
consensus about their motives and role among the public in the South. The largest and 
most active NGOs have shown the persistence and capacity to learn from their experience 
and to adjust their program approaches in order to maintain their engagement with the 
North. Their approach is in the process of changing from “unconditional engagement” to 
what might be called “partnership engagement” in which there are clear expectations of 
active cooperation and mutual contributions to development-oriented projects. 
 
Nevertheless, it is clear that the NGO approach to engagement has had its 
limitations. The scale of assistance remains relatively modest and is becoming more 
dependent on government subsidies. While gradually expanding, their degree of 
penetration into North Korean civilian society is still limited. Perhaps the biggest 
challenge for South Korean NGOs will come if the plans for greatly increasing South-
North economic cooperation agreed to in the October 2007 summit are actually 
implemented by the new Lee Myung-bak Administration. Both governments have 
justified the role of the NGOs, to some extent, as a substitute for their constrained official 
interaction. What happens when assistance through official channels is stepped up?  
 
… 
 
To meet these challenges the South Korean humanitarian NGOs should accelerate 
their efforts toward professionalization and coordination. They should strengthen their 
capacity for planning and managing development assistance projects drawing on the 
extensive international experience in transitional states. They should increase their level 
of coordination and cooperation within their own sector as well as with international 
NGOs working with North Korea. The Korean government, for its part, should treat the 
NGO sector as an essential but independent partner for the South’s engagement policy 
toward the North. In this way, rather than remaining an adjunct, NGOs will be 
mainstreamed into South Korea’s engagement strategy. 
 
NGO engagement represents the first steps toward people-to-people reconciliation 
between South and North Korea. Given the vast economic gap between the two sides, 
NGO engagement will continue to have an essential role to play, not only in addressing 
humanitarian and development needs in the North, but more importantly, in creating the 
multiple strands of human contact on which reconciliation and unification must be built. 
 
